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.The relationship between the two communities is a lesson in the factitiousness of “race.” To the Americo-Liberians, these were “natives”—an illicit slave trade in Malinke people continued until the 1850s.As late as 1931, the League of Nations uncovered the use of forced indigenous labor.Abraham, in the front seat, bends his head round to Lysbeth in the back: “You know what we say to that seal? The Love of Liberty MET us here.” This is a popular Liberian joke.He laughs immoderately.“So that’s how it was.They came here, and they always kept the power away from us! They had their True Whig Party, and for 133 years we were a peaceful one-party state.But there was no justice.The indigenous are ninety-five percent of this country, but we had nothing.Oh, those Congos—they had every little bit of power.Everyone in the government was Congo.They did each other favors, gave each other money.We were not even allowed the vote until very late—the sixties!”Lys asks a reasonable question: “But how would one know someone was a Congo?”“Oh, you would know.They had a way of speaking, a way of dressing.They always called each other “Mister.” Always the big man.And they lived very well.This,” he says, waving at the devastation of Monrovia, “was all very nice.”The largest concrete structures—the old Ministry of Health, the old Ministry of Defense, the True Whig Party headquarters—are remnants of the peaceful, unjust regimes of President Tubman (1944-71) and President Tolbert (1971-80), for whom Liberians feel a perverse nostalgia.The university, the hospital, the schools, these were financed by a True Whig policy of massive international loans and deregulated foreign business concessions, typically given to agriculturally “extractive” companies, which ship resources directly out of the country without committing their companies to any value-added processing.For much of the twentieth century, Liberia had a nickname: Firestone Republic.The deals that condemned Liberians to poverty wages and inhumane living conditions were made in these old government buildings.The people who benefited most from these deals worked in these buildings.Now these buildings have rags hanging from their windows, bullet holes in their facades and thousands of squatters inside, without toilets, without running water.Naturally, new buildings are built, new deals are made.On January 28, 2005, while an interim “caretaker” government presided briefly over a ruined country (the elections were due later that year), Firestone rushed through a new concession: fifty cents an acre for the next thirty-seven years.A processing plant—for which Liberians have been asking since the 1970s—was not part of this deal.Ministers of finance and agriculture, who had no mandate from the people and would be out of office in a few months, negotiated the deal.It was signed in the Cabinet Room at the Executive Mansion in the presence of John Blaney, U.S.ambassador at the time.During the same period, Mittal Steel acquired the country’s iron ore, giving the company virtual control of the vast Nimba concession area.The campaigning group Global Witness described the Mittal deal as a “case study in which multinational corporations seek to maximise profit by using an international regulatory void to gain concessions and contracts which strongly favour the corporation over the host nation.”It is a frustration for activists that Liberians have tended not to trace their trouble back to extractive foreign companies or their government lobbies.Liberians don’t think that way.Most Liberians know how much a rubber tapper gets paid: thirty-five American dollars a month.Everyone knows how much a government minister is paid: two thousand American dollars a month—a Liberian fortune.No one can tell you Firestone’s annual profit (in 2005, from its Liberia production alone: $81,242,190).In a country without a middle or working class, without a functioning civic life, government is all
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